38 search results - page 3 / 8 » First-price path auctions |
EUROPAR
2008
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
2008
Springer
Abstract. Different auction-based approaches have been used to allocate resources in Grids, but none of them provide the design choice for a specific economic model while consideri...
CORR
2006
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2006
Springer
In set-system auctions, there are several overlapping teams of agents, and a task that can be completed by any of these teams. The auctioneer's goal is to hire a team and pay...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2006
Springer
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
We study the frugality ratio of truthful mechanisms in path auctions, which measures the extent to which truthful mechanisms “overpay” compared to non-truthful mechanisms. In p...
WINE
2005
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2005
Springer
We study the complexity issues for Walrasian equilibrium in a special case of combinatorial auction, called single-minded auction, in which every participant is interested in only ...