30 search results - page 1 / 6 » Frugality in path auctions |
CORR
2006
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2006
Springer
In set-system auctions, there are several overlapping teams of agents, and a task that can be completed by any of these teams. The auctioneer's goal is to hire a team and pay...
SODA
2004
ACM
13 years 6 months ago
2004
ACM
We consider the problem of picking (buying) an inexpensive s-t path in a graph where edges are owned by independent (selfish) agents, and the cost of an edge is known to its owner...
FOCS
2005
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
2005
IEEE
We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the ...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2003
ACM
We study mechanisms that can be modelled as coalitional games with transferable utilities, and apply ideas from mechanism design and game theory to problems arising in a network d...
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2007
Springer
We study the frugality ratio of truthful mechanisms in path auctions, which measures the extent to which truthful mechanisms “overpay” compared to non-truthful mechanisms. In p...