In this paper, we propose a novel general framework for analysing competing double auction markets that vie for traders, who then need to choose which market to go to. Based on th...
Bing Shi, Enrico H. Gerding, Perukrishnen Vyteling...
One attractive feature of market scoring rules [Hanson '03] is that they are myopically strategyproof: It is optimal for a trader to report her true belief about the likeliho...
In a market-based scheduling mechanism, the allocation of time-specific resources to tasks is governed by a competitive bidding process. Agents bidding for multiple, separately al...
Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Anna Osepayshvili, Daniel...
Abstract. Congestion games are a well-studied model for resource sharing among uncoordinated selfish agents. Usually, one assumes that the resources in a congestion game do not hav...
Heiner Ackermann, Paul W. Goldberg, Vahab S. Mirro...
We study the strategic behavior of risk-neutral non-myopic agents in Dynamic Parimutuel Markets (DPM). In a DPM, agents buy or sell shares of contracts, whose future payoff in a p...