20 search results - page 1 / 4 » Generalizing preference elicitation in combinatorial auction... |
ATAL
2003
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2003
Springer
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2004
ACM
We consider the parallels between the preference elicitation problem in combinatorial auctions and the problem of learning an unknown function from learning theory. We show that l...
CORR
2002
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2002
Springer
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
ATAL
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2004
Springer
Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are desirable because the agents can express complementarity and substitutability among ...
AAAI
2004
13 years 6 months ago
2004
Recent algorithms provide powerful solutions to the problem of determining cost-minimizing (or revenue-maximizing) allocations of items in combinatorial auctions. However, in many...