Abstract. In this paper we initiate an exploration of relationships between “preference elicitation”, a learning-style problem that arises in combinatorial auctions, and the pr...
Avrim Blum, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Tuomas Sandholm, M...
Combinatorial auctions have been used in procurement markets with economies of scope. Preference elicitation is already a problem in single-unit combinatorial auctions, but it bec...
Martin Bichler, Stefan Schneider, Kemal Guler, Meh...
In this paper we introduce a new graph based bidding language for combinatorial auctions. In our language, each bidder submits to the arbitrator a generalized flow network (netbid...
Madalina Croitoru, Cornelius Croitoru, Paul H. Lew...
Combinatorial auctions, that is, auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to more efficient allocations than traditional auction mechanisms in multi-i...
Bidding for multiple items or bundles on online auctions raises challenging problems. We assume that an agent has a valuation function that returns its valuation for an arbitrary ...