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» How Explicit Are the Barriers to Failure in Safety Arguments
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SAFECOMP
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
How Explicit Are the Barriers to Failure in Safety Arguments?
Safety cases embody arguments that demonstrate how safety properties of a system are upheld. Such cases implicitly document the barriers that must exist between hazards and vulnera...
Shamus P. Smith, Michael D. Harrison, Bastiaan A. ...
IJCCBS
2010
105views more  IJCCBS 2010»
13 years 3 months ago
Software safety: relating software assurance and software integrity
: The overall safety integrity of a safety critical system, comprising both software and hardware, is typically specified quantitatively, e.g., in terms of failure rates. However, ...
Ibrahim Habli, Richard Hawkins, Tim Kelly
SAFECOMP
1999
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies
Abstract. This paper introduces a new method for safety analysis called HiPHOPS (Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies). HiP-HOPS originates from a number ...
Yiannis Papadopoulos, John A. McDermid
ICST
2010
IEEE
13 years 3 months ago
Characterizing the Chain of Evidence for Software Safety Cases: A Conceptual Model Based on the IEC 61508 Standard
— Increasingly, licensing and safety regulatory bodies require the suppliers of software-intensive, safety-critical systems to provide an explicit software safety case – a stru...
Rajwinder Kaur Panesar-Walawege, Mehrdad Sabetzade...
SAFECOMP
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Establishing a Framework for Dynamic Risk Management in 'Intelligent' Aero-Engine Control
The behaviour of control functions in safety critical software systems is typically bounded to prevent the occurrence of known system level hazards. These bounds are typically deri...
Zeshan Kurd, Tim Kelly, John A. McDermid, Radu Cal...