In the analysis of security protocols, the knowledge of attackers is often described in terms of message deducibility and indistinguishability relations. In this paper, we pursue ...
Abstract. In formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usually modeled by terms together with an equational theory, axiomatizing the properties of the cryptographic funct...
Abstract. In formal approaches, messages sent over a network are usually modeled by terms together with an equational theory, axiomatizing the properties of the cryptographic funct...
Logics for security protocol analysis require the formalization of an adversary model that specifies the capabilities of adversaries. A common model is the Dolev-Yao model, which c...
Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a framework composed of a syntax and its compositional Petri net semantics, for the specification and verification of properties (like authent...
Roland Bouroulet, Raymond R. Devillers, Hanna Klau...