10 search results - page 1 / 2 » Learning Payoffs in Large Symmetric Games |
AI
2004
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2004
Springer
Efficient Learning Equilibrium (ELE) is a natural solution concept for multi-agent encounters with incomplete information. It requires the learning algorithms themselves to be in ...
CORR
2002
Springer
13 years 4 months ago
2002
Springer
Game theoretic models of learning which are based on the strategic form of the game cannot explain learning in games with large extensive form. We study learning in such games by ...
TSMC
1998
13 years 4 months ago
1998
— Parallel algorithms are presented for modules of learning automata with the objective of improving their speed of convergence without compromising accuracy. A general procedure...
CRYPTO
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2009
Springer
Abstract. We consider enhancing with privacy concerns a large class of auctions, which include sealed-bid single-item auctions but also general multi-item multi-winner auctions, ou...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2006
Springer
This paper proposes an efficient agent for competing in Cliff Edge (CE) environments, such as sealed-bid auctions, dynamic pricing and the ultimatum game. The agent competes in on...