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SODA
2010
ACM
148views Algorithms» more  SODA 2010»
14 years 2 months ago
Limits on the Social Welfare of Maximal-In-Range Auction Mechanisms
Many commonly-used auction mechanisms are "maximal-in-range". We show that any maximalin-range mechanism for n bidders and m items cannot both approximate the social wel...
Dave Buchfuhrer, Chris Umans
ICALP
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
We study the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special ca...
Allan Borodin, Brendan Lucier
CORR
2010
Springer
90views Education» more  CORR 2010»
13 years 4 months ago
Multi-Unit Auctions: Beyond Roberts
We exhibit incentive compatible multi-unit auctions that are not affine maximizers (i.e. are not of the VCG family) and yet approximate the social welfare to within a factor of 1 ...
Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan
INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
12 years 8 months ago
Strategyproof auctions for balancing social welfare and fairness in secondary spectrum markets
Abstract—Secondary spectrum access is emerging as a promising approach for mitigating the spectrum scarcity in wireless networks. Coordinated spectrum access for secondary users ...
Ajay Gopinathan, Zongpeng Li, Chuan Wu
INFOCOM
2012
IEEE
11 years 7 months ago
Truthful spectrum auction design for secondary networks
Abstract—Opportunistic wireless channel access by nonlicensed users has emerged as a promising solution for addressing the bandwidth scarcity challenge. Auctions represent a natu...
Yuefei Zhu, Baochun Li, Zongpeng Li