35 search results - page 3 / 7 » Limits on the Social Welfare of Maximal-In-Range Auction Mec... |
GLOBECOM
2009
IEEE
14 years 22 days ago
2009
IEEE
— This paper studies an auction based allocation of network resources for short-term contracts for heterogeneous network services. The combinatorial winner selection yields the o...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2010
ACM
We study the problem of selling identical goods to n unit-demand bidders in a setting in which the total supply of goods is unknown to the mechanism. Items arrive dynamically, and...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 3 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj : R R+. We give...
WINE
2009
Springer
14 years 17 days ago
2009
Springer
A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem wi...
PERCOM
2010
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2010
ACM
—This paper studies economic models of user participation incentive in participatory sensing applications. User participation is the most important element in participatory sensi...