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ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
Manipulation of copeland elections
We resolve an open problem regarding the complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation, namely, the complexity of Copeland -manipulation for {0, 1}. Copeland , 0 1, is an...
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Henning Sch...
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Copeland voting: ties matter
We study the complexity of manipulation for a family of election systems derived from Copeland voting via introducing a parameter that describes how ties in head-to-head contests...
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Henning Sch...
CORR
2012
Springer
193views Education» more  CORR 2012»
12 years 8 days ago
Search versus Decision for Election Manipulation Problems
Most theoretical definitions about the complexity of manipulating elections focus on the decision problem of recognizing which instances can be successfully manipulated, rather t...
Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Curtis M...
AAAI
2012
11 years 7 months ago
Evaluating Resistance to False-Name Manipulations in Elections
In many mechanisms (especially online mechanisms), a strategic agent can influence the outcome by creating multiple false identities. We consider voting settings where the mechan...
Bo Waggoner, Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
SIAMCOMP
2011
12 years 7 months ago
A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-dictatorial election rule among at least three alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative versi...
Ehud Friedgut, Gil Kalai, Nathan Keller, Noam Nisa...