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» Mechanism Design for Preference Aggregation over Coalitions
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CP
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Mechanism Design for Preference Aggregation over Coalitions
The aggregation of individuals’ preferences into a single group outcome is both well-studied and fundamental within decision theory. Historically, though, a pervasive simplifica...
Eric I. Hsu, Sheila A. McIlraith
AAAI
2007
13 years 7 months ago
Logic for Automated Mechanism Design - A Progress Report
Over the past half decade, we have been exploring the use of logic in the specification and analysis of computational economic mechanisms. We believe that this approach has the p...
Michael Wooldridge, Thomas Ågotnes, Paul E. ...
CORR
2002
Springer
159views Education» more  CORR 2002»
13 years 4 months ago
Complexity of Mechanism Design
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism de...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
IJCAI
2007
13 years 6 months ago
Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms
Mechanism design is the study of preference aggregation protocols that work well in the face of self-interested agents. We present the first general-purpose techniques for automa...
Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier
FOIKS
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Aggregation of Attack Relations: A Social-Choice Theoretical Analysis of Defeasibility Criteria
Abstract. This paper analyzes the aggregation of different abstract attack relations over a common set of arguments. Each of those attack relations can be considered as the represe...
Fernando A. Tohmé, Gustavo Adrian Bodanza, ...