9 search results - page 2 / 2 » Mechanism Design for Single Leader Stackelberg Problems and ... |
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2005
ACM
We study a multi-unit auction with multiple bidders, each of whom has a private valuation and a budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense ...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2003
ACM
We consider the problem of designing fast and strategyproof exchanges for dynamic resource allocation problems in distributed systems. The exchange is implemented as a sequence of...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 3 months ago
2010
Springer
Online auctions in which items are sold in an online fashion with little knowledge about future bids are common in the internet environment. We study here a problem in which an auc...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2010
ACM
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for singl...