We exhibit incentive compatible multi-unit auctions that are not affine maximizers (i.e. are not of the VCG family) and yet approximate the social welfare to within a factor of 1 ...
When autonomous agents decide on their bidding strategies in real world auctions, they have a number of concerns that go beyond the models that are normally analyzed in traditiona...
This paper concerns the design of mechanisms for online scheduling in which agents bid for access to a re-usable resource such as processor time or wireless network access. Each a...
Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mo...
We consider situations in which a decision-maker with a fixed budget faces a sequence of options, each with a cost and a value, and must select a subset of them online so as to ma...
Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, David Kempe, Rob...