This paper analyzes sequential auctions for budget constrained bidders, for multiple heterogeneous common value objects. In most auctions, bidders not only have valuations for obj...
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R....
Abstract: The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (singl...
We consider the budget-constrained bidding optimization problem for sponsored search auctions, and model it as an online (multiple-choice) knapsack problem. We design both determi...
Yunhong Zhou, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Rajan M. Luko...
We exhibit incentive compatible multi-unit auctions that are not affine maximizers (i.e. are not of the VCG family) and yet approximate the social welfare to within a factor of 1 ...
When autonomous agents decide on their bidding strategies in real world auctions, they have a number of concerns that go beyond the models that are normally analyzed in traditiona...