We obtain a characterization of feasible, Bayesian, multi-item multi-bidder mechanisms with independent, additive bidders as distributions over hierarchical mechanisms. Combined w...
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Wein...
We present mechanisms, architectures, and an implementation addressing challenges with mobile opportunistic commerce centering on markets and mechanisms that support the procureme...
Online auctions are inherently dynamic. Online auction designs that internalize temporal changes in the economic environment are generally expected to perform better than static d...
Sponsored search auction is used by most search engines to select ads to display on the web page of a search result, according to advertisers’ bidding prices. The income of this ...
Consider selling bundles of indivisible goods to buyers with concave utilities that are additively separable in money and goods. We propose an ascending auction for the case when ...
Sushil Bikhchandani, Sven de Vries, James Schummer...