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» Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipu...
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CLIMA
2010
13 years 5 months ago
Is Computational Complexity a Barrier to Manipulation?
When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballo...
Toby Walsh
SAGT
2010
Springer
191views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2010»
13 years 4 months ago
Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting
We investigate the computational aspects of safe manipulation, a new model of coalitional manipulation that was recently put forward by Slinko and White [11]. In this model, a pot...
Noam Hazon, Edith Elkind
AAAI
2007
13 years 8 months ago
Uncertainty in Preference Elicitation and Aggregation
Uncertainty arises in preference aggregation in several ways. There may, for example, be uncertainty in the votes or the voting rule. Such uncertainty can introduce computational ...
Toby Walsh
AAAI
2010
13 years 7 months ago
Approximation Algorithms and Mechanism Design for Minimax Approval Voting
We consider approval voting elections in which each voter votes for a (possibly empty) set of candidates and the outcome consists of a set of k candidates for some parameter k, e....
Ioannis Caragiannis, Dimitris Kalaitzis, Evangelos...
DAGSTUHL
2007
13 years 7 months ago
Weighted Voronoi Region Algorithms for Political Districting
Automated political districting shares with electronic voting the aim of preventing electoral manipulation and pursuing an impartial electoral mechanism. Political districting can...
Bruno Simeone, Federica Ricca, Andrea Scozzari