64 search results - page 13 / 13 » On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations |
AAAI
2000
13 years 7 months ago
2000
We describe MarketSAT, a highly decentralized, marketbased algorithm for propositional satisfiability. The approach is based on a formulation of satisfiability as production on a ...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2006
Springer
Abstract. We introduce take-it-or-leave-it auctions (TLAs) as an allocation mechanism that allows buyers to retain much of their private valuation information, yet generates close-...
AAAI
2008
13 years 8 months ago
2008
In this paper, we combine for the first time the methods of dynamic mechanism design with techniques from decentralized decision making under uncertainty. Consider a multi-agent s...
IJCAI
2001
13 years 7 months ago
2001
Generalized Vickrey mechanisms have received wide attention in the literature because they are efficient and strategyproof, i.e. truthful bidding is optimal whatever the bids of o...