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INFOCOM
2012
IEEE
11 years 8 months ago
Truthful spectrum auction design for secondary networks
Abstract—Opportunistic wireless channel access by nonlicensed users has emerged as a promising solution for addressing the bandwidth scarcity challenge. Auctions represent a natu...
Yuefei Zhu, Baochun Li, Zongpeng Li
INFOCOM
2009
IEEE
14 years 12 days ago
TRUST: A General Framework for Truthful Double Spectrum Auctions
— We design truthful double spectrum auctions where multiple parties can trade spectrum based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing sp...
Xia Zhou, Haitao Zheng
FOCS
2003
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan
CORR
2011
Springer
177views Education» more  CORR 2011»
13 years 23 days ago
A Truthful Randomized Mechanism for Combinatorial Public Projects via Convex Optimization
In Combinatorial Public Projects, there is a set of projects that may be undertaken, and a set of selfinterested players with a stake in the set of projects chosen. A public plann...
Shaddin Dughmi
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
83views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
14 years 8 days ago
The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the class...
Nikhil R. Devanur, Sham M. Kakade