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» On No-Regret Learning, Fictitious Play, and Nash Equilibrium
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NIPS
2001
13 years 6 months ago
Playing is believing: The role of beliefs in multi-agent learning
We propose a new classification for multi-agent learning algorithms, with each league of players characterized by both their possible strategies and possible beliefs. Using this c...
Yu-Han Chang, Leslie Pack Kaelbling
SAGT
2010
Springer
175views Game Theory» more  SAGT 2010»
13 years 3 months ago
On Learning Algorithms for Nash Equilibria
Can learning algorithms find a Nash equilibrium? This is a natural question for several reasons. Learning algorithms resemble the behavior of players in many naturally arising gam...
Constantinos Daskalakis, Rafael Frongillo, Christo...
ICML
2003
IEEE
14 years 6 months ago
Learning To Cooperate in a Social Dilemma: A Satisficing Approach to Bargaining
Learning in many multi-agent settings is inherently repeated play. This calls into question the naive application of single play Nash equilibria in multi-agent learning and sugges...
Jeff L. Stimpson, Michael A. Goodrich
NIPS
2003
13 years 6 months ago
Learning Near-Pareto-Optimal Conventions in Polynomial Time
We study how to learn to play a Pareto-optimal strict Nash equilibrium when there exist multiple equilibria and agents may have different preferences among the equilibria. We focu...
Xiao Feng Wang, Tuomas Sandholm
ICML
2003
IEEE
14 years 6 months ago
AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Oppon
A satisfactory multiagent learning algorithm should, at a minimum, learn to play optimally against stationary opponents and converge to a Nash equilibrium in self-play. The algori...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm