24 search results - page 1 / 5 » On revenue equivalence in truthful mechanisms |
COLOGNETWENTE
2007
13 years 7 months ago
2007
Presentation
A presentation about Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue Equivalence, Pro
t Maximization, and Information Disclosure.
MOBIHOC
2009
ACM
14 years 8 days ago
2009
ACM
Spectrum is a critical yet scarce resource and it has been shown that dynamic spectrum access can significantly improve spectrum utilization. To achieve this, it is important to ...
WINE
2005
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2005
Springer
We present a mechanism for reservations of bursty resources that is both truthful and robust. It consists of option contracts whose pricing structure induces users to reveal the tr...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 12 months ago
2009
ACM
We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the class...