17 search results - page 1 / 4 » On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful C... |
ICALP
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2010
Springer
We study the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special ca...
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
This paper characterizes the family of truthful doublesided auctions. Despite the importance of double-sided auctions to market design, to date no characterization of truthful dou...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
MFCS
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
We study simple greedy approximation algorithms for general class of integer packing problems. We provide a novel analysis based on the duality theory of linear programming. This e...
APPROX
2009
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2009
Springer
An important research thread in algorithmic game theory studies the design of efficient truthful mechanisms that approximate the optimal social welfare. A fundamental question is ...