17 search results - page 2 / 4 » On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful C... |
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2004
ACM
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
INFOCOM
2012
IEEE
11 years 7 months ago
2012
IEEE
Abstract—Opportunistic wireless channel access by nonlicensed users has emerged as a promising solution for addressing the bandwidth scarcity challenge. Auctions represent a natu...
FOCS
2005
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
2005
IEEE
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also bounds ...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2010
Springer
Combinatorial auctions have been studied by the multiagent systems community for some time, since these auctions are an effective mechanism for resource allocation when agents are...
SOFSEM
2009
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
2009
Springer
Abstract. Computational mechanism design (CMD) seeks to understand how to design game forms that induce desirable outcomes in multiagent systems despite private information, self-i...