—We consider routing games where the performance of each user is dictated by the worst (bottleneck) element it employs. We are given a network, finitely many (selfish) users, eac...
We consider the price of selfish routing in terms of tradeoffs and from an average-case perspective. Each player in a network game seeks to send a message with a certain length by...
This paper studies —from the perspective of efficient computation— a type of competition that is widespread throughout the plant and animal kingdoms, higher education, politic...
Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg, Piotr Kryst...
We consider a wireless collision channel, shared by a finite number of users who transmit to a common base station. Each user wishes to minimize its average transmission rate (or p...
In traditional game theory, players are typically endowed with exogenously given knowledge of the structure of the game—either full omniscient knowledge or partial but fixed in...
Matt Lepinski, David Liben-Nowell, Seth Gilbert, A...