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» Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting
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AAAI
2008
13 years 7 months ago
Optimal False-Name-Proof Voting Rules with Costly Voting
One way for agents to reach a joint decision is to vote over the alternatives. In open, anonymous settings such as the Internet, an agent can vote more than once without being det...
Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer
WINE
2010
Springer
148views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 2 months ago
False-Name-Proofness in Social Networks
In mechanism design, the goal is to create rules for making a decision based on the preferences of multiple parties (agents), while taking into account that agents may behave stra...
Vincent Conitzer, Nicole Immorlica, Joshua Letchfo...
AAAI
2010
13 years 6 months ago
Voting Almost Maximizes Social Welfare Despite Limited Communication
In cooperative multiagent systems an alternative that maximizes the social welfare--the sum of utilities--can only be selected if each agent reports its full utility function. Thi...
Ioannis Caragiannis, Ariel D. Procaccia
ALDT
2011
Springer
200views Algorithms» more  ALDT 2011»
12 years 4 months ago
Vote Elicitation with Probabilistic Preference Models: Empirical Estimation and Cost Tradeoffs
A variety of preference aggregation schemes and voting rules have been developed in social choice to support group decision making. However, the requirement that participants provi...
Tyler Lu, Craig Boutilier
AAAI
2012
11 years 7 months ago
A Dynamic Rationalization of Distance Rationalizability
Distance rationalizability is an intuitive paradigm for developing and studying voting rules: given a notion of consensus and a distance function on preference profiles, a ration...
Craig Boutilier, Ariel D. Procaccia