141 search results - page 2 / 29 » Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms |
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
HIPC
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2004
Springer
Abstract. We consider the problem of redistributing data on homogeneous and heterogeneous processor rings. The problem arises in several applications, each time after a load-balanc...
Publication
There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p)
each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem
s...
Publication
In this paper, we seek to design a Groves mechanism for
assigning p heterogeneous objects among n competing agents (n > p)
with unit demand, satisfying weak budget balance, in...