Our attention is focused on designing an optimal procurement mechanism which a buyer can use for procuring multiple units of a homogeneous item based on bids submitted by autonomou...
N. Hemachandra, Raghav Kumar Gautam, V. Hastagiri ...
We present a novel algorithm for computing the optimal winning bids in a combinatorial auction (CA), that is, an auction in which bidders bid for bundles of goods. All previously ...
Kevin Leyton-Brown, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz
We present an incentive-compatible polynomial-time approximation scheme for multiunit auctions with general k-minded player valuations. The mechanism fully optimizes over an appro...
We investigate asymptotically optimal keyword auctions, that is, auctions which maximize revenue as the number of bidders grows. We do so under two alternative behavioral assumpti...
We study the recognized open problem of designing revenuemaximizing combinatorial auctions. It is unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. Rather than pursuing the pu...