Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions (MMUCAs) allow agents to bid for bundles of goods to buy, goods to sell, and transformations of goods. In particular, MMUCAs offer a high ...
Combinatorial auctions, where buyers can bid on bundles of items rather than bidding them sequentially, often lead to more economically efficient allocations of financial resource...
Abstract. We present a Lagrangian-based heuristic LAHA for the Winner Determination Problem in Combinatorial Auctions. The algorithm makes use of the market computing power by appl...
Combinatorial auctions, that is, auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to more efficient allocations than traditional auction mechanisms in multi-i...
We present a solution to the winner determination problem which takes into account not only costs but also risk aversion of the agent that accepts the bids, and which works for au...