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» Power Indices and minimal winning Coalitions
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CORR
2008
Springer
113views Education» more  CORR 2008»
13 years 4 months ago
Power Indices and minimal winning Coalitions
The Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index are the best-known and the most used tools to measure political power of voters in simple voting games. Most methods to calc...
Werner Kirsch, Jessica Langner
EOR
2011
140views more  EOR 2011»
12 years 11 months ago
Power indices of simple games and vector-weighted majority games by means of binary decision diagrams
A simple game is a pair consisting of a finite set N of players and a set W ⊆ 2N of winning coalitions. (Vector-)weighted majority games ((V)WMG) are a special case of simple ga...
Stefan Bolus
EOR
2011
113views more  EOR 2011»
12 years 11 months ago
A relation-algebraic approach to simple games
Simple games are a powerful tool to analyze decision-making and coalition formation in social and political life. In this paper, we present relation-algebraic models of simple game...
Rudolf Berghammer, Stefan Bolus, Agnieszka Rusinow...
MFCS
2010
Springer
13 years 3 months ago
Proof Systems and Transformation Games
We introduce Transformation Games (TGs), a form of coalitional game in which players are endowed with sets of initial resources, and have capabilities allowing them to derive certa...
Yoram Bachrach, Michael Zuckerman, Michael Wooldri...
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Path disruption games
We propose Path Disruption Games (PDGs), which consider collaboration between agents attempting stop an adversary from travelling from a source node to a target node in a graph. P...
Yoram Bachrach, Ely Porat