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Presentation
Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignments of Heterogeneous Objects
Publication
There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p)
each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem
s...
Publication
In this paper, we seek to design a Groves mechanism for
assigning p heterogeneous objects among n competing agents (n > p)
with unit demand, satisfying weak budget balance, in...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
Publication
There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n
competing agents (n > p) each with unit demand. It is
required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment
problem ...