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SIGECOM
2005
ACM
122views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 11 months ago
Robust solutions for combinatorial auctions
Bids submitted in auctions are usually treated as enforceable commitments in most bidding and auction theory literature. In reality bidders often withdraw winning bids before the ...
Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan
ICIS
2000
13 years 6 months ago
Economic mechanism design for securing online auctions
Enhancing e-commerce security through computing technology alone is not sufficient. E-commerce designers should apply economic mechanisms to design proper digital processes that a...
Wenli Wang, Zoltán Hidvégi, Andrew B...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
False-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol: Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation
This paper develops a new combinatorial auction protocol called the Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation (GM-SMA). This protocol satisfies the following characteristics:...
Makoto Yokoo, Toshihiro Matsutani, Atsushi Iwasaki
DALT
2008
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Abstracting and Verifying Strategy-Proofness for Auction Mechanisms
ing and Verifying Strategy-proofness for Auction Mechanisms E. M. Tadjouddine, F. Guerin, and W. Vasconcelos Department of Computing Science, King's College, University of Abe...
Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin, Wamberto We...