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» Strategic Voting and Strategic Candidacy
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MSS
2008
IEEE
58views Hardware» more  MSS 2008»
13 years 5 months ago
Voting with preferences over margins of victory
This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over the support that each alternative receives, and not only over the...
Humberto Llavador
AAAI
2010
13 years 7 months ago
Convergence to Equilibria in Plurality Voting
Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of action or allocation of resources, are central to AI. In such situations, agents' ...
Reshef Meir, Maria Polukarov, Jeffrey S. Rosensche...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
103views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
13 years 5 months ago
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that (in unrestricted settings) any reasonable voting rule is manipulable. Recently, a quantitative version of this theorem was proved by ...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
AAAI
2012
11 years 8 months ago
Evaluating Resistance to False-Name Manipulations in Elections
In many mechanisms (especially online mechanisms), a strategic agent can influence the outcome by creating multiple false identities. We consider voting settings where the mechan...
Bo Waggoner, Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
ATAL
2005
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a key issue in multiagent systems. Due to its universality, voting has a central role among preference aggregation mechanisms. Votin...
Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm