This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over the support that each alternative receives, and not only over the...
Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of action or allocation of resources, are central to AI. In such situations, agents' ...
Reshef Meir, Maria Polukarov, Jeffrey S. Rosensche...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that (in unrestricted settings) any reasonable voting rule is manipulable. Recently, a quantitative version of this theorem was proved by ...
In many mechanisms (especially online mechanisms), a strategic agent can influence the outcome by creating multiple false identities. We consider voting settings where the mechan...
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a key issue in multiagent systems. Due to its universality, voting has a central role among preference aggregation mechanisms. Votin...