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» Strategic Voting and Strategic Candidacy
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AAAI
2010
13 years 6 months ago
Stackelberg Voting Games: Computational Aspects and Paradoxes
We consider settings in which voters vote in sequence, each voter knows the votes of the earlier voters and the preferences of the later voters, and voters are strategic. This can...
Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating togethe...
Toby Walsh
MCS
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
An Ensemble Approach for Incremental Learning in Nonstationary Environments
Abstract. We describe an ensemble of classifiers based algorithm for incremental learning in nonstationary environments. In this formulation, we assume that the learner is presente...
Michael Muhlbaier, Robi Polikar
IJCNN
2006
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
Support Vector Machines to Weight Voters in a Voting System of Entity Extractors
—Support Vector Machines are used to combine the outputs of multiple entity extractors, thus creating a composite entity extraction system. The composite system has a significant...
Deborah Duong, James Venuto, Ben Goertzel, Ryan Ri...
WINE
2010
Springer
148views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 3 months ago
False-Name-Proofness in Social Networks
In mechanism design, the goal is to create rules for making a decision based on the preferences of multiple parties (agents), while taking into account that agents may behave stra...
Vincent Conitzer, Nicole Immorlica, Joshua Letchfo...