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» Strategic bidder behavior in sponsored search auctions
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ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
Reducing costly information acquisition in auctions
Most research on auctions assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingness to pay for the item being auctioned, and that they use this information s...
Kate Larson
COR
2010
96views more  COR 2010»
13 years 5 months ago
Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions
Activity rules have emerged in recent years as an important aspect of practical auction design. The role of an activity rule in an iterative auction is to suppress strategic behav...
Pavithra Harsha, Cynthia Barnhart, David C. Parkes...
WINE
2009
Springer
199views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 11 days ago
Externalities in Keyword Auctions: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment
It is widely believed that the value of acquiring a slot in a sponsored search list (that comes along with the organic links in a search engine’s result page) highly depends on ...
Renato Gomes, Nicole Immorlica, Evangelos Markakis
WINE
2009
Springer
194views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 11 days ago
Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders
A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem wi...
Ravi Kumar, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Sayedi
ATAL
2004
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
Experiments on Deliberation Equilibria in Auctions
Auctions are useful mechanisms for allocating items (goods, tasks, resources, etc.) in multiagent systems. The bulk of auction theory assumes that the bidders know their own valua...
Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm