In this paper, we initiate a study of zero knowledge proof systems in the presence of sidechannel attacks. Specifically, we consider a setting where a cheating verifier is allow...
Abstract. We construct an intrusion-resilient symmetric-key authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol in the bounded retrieval model. The model employs a long shared private key to...
David Cash, Yan Zong Ding, Yevgeniy Dodis, Wenke L...
We construct the first public-key encryption scheme in the Bounded-Retrieval Model (BRM), providing security against various forms of adversarial “key leakage” attacks. In th...
Abstract. Physical computational devices leak side-channel information that may, and often does, reveal secret internal states. We present a general transformation that compiles an...
Sebastian Faust, Tal Rabin, Leonid Reyzin, Eran Tr...
We introduce a new primitive called Intrusion-Resilient Secret Sharing (IRSS), whose security proof exploits the fact that there exist functions which can be efficiently computed ...