Sciweavers

6 search results - page 1 / 2
» The Power of Sequential Single-Item Auctions for Agent Coord...
Sort
View
AAAI
2006
13 years 6 months ago
The Power of Sequential Single-Item Auctions for Agent Coordination
Teams of robots are more fault tolerant than single robots, and auctions appear to be promising means for coordinating them. In a recent paper at "Robotics: Science and Syste...
Sven Koenig, Craig A. Tovey, Michail G. Lagoudakis...
AAAI
2008
13 years 7 months ago
Agent Coordination with Regret Clearing
Sequential single-item auctions can be used for the distributed allocation of tasks to cooperating agents. We study how to improve the team performance of sequential singleitem au...
Sven Koenig, Xiaoming Zheng, Craig A. Tovey, Richa...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Evaluating bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions
Bidding for multiple items or bundles on online auctions raises challenging problems. We assume that an agent has a valuation function that returns its valuation for an arbitrary ...
Teddy Candale, Sandip Sen
WEBI
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Incentive-Compatible Social Choice
Many situations present a social choice problem where different self-interested agents have to agree on joint, coordinated decisions. For example, power companies have to agree o...
Boi Faltings
ATAL
2011
Springer
12 years 4 months ago
Online mechanism design for electric vehicle charging
Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles are expected to place a considerable strain on local electricity distribution networks, requiring charging to be coordinated in order to accommoda...
Enrico H. Gerding, Valentin Robu, Sebastian Stein,...