We analyze the structure of equilibria and the price of anarchy in the family of network creation games considered extensively in the past few years, which attempt to unify the net...
Erik D. Demaine, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Hamid M...
A strong equilibrium (Aumann 1959) is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy to be the ratio of the worst c...
We introduce a novel game that models the creation of Internet-like networks by selfish node-agents without central design or coordination. Nodes pay for the links that they esta...
Alex Fabrikant, Ankur Luthra, Elitza N. Maneva, Ch...
We investigate the price of anarchy of a load balancing game with K dispatchers. The service rates and holding costs are assumed to depend on the server, and the service disciplin...
We study the impact of collusion in network games with splittable flow and focus on the well established price of anarchy as a measure of this impact. We first investigate symmet...