33 search results - page 1 / 7 » Truthful Mechanisms for Generalized Utilitarian Problems |
IFIP
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2004
Springer
In this paper we investigate extensions of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms to problems whose objective function is not utilitarian and whose agents’ utiliti...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2005
ACM
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...
AAAI
2006
13 years 6 months ago
2006
We examine a setting in which a buyer wishes to purchase probabilistic information from some agent. The seller must invest effort in order to gain access to the information, and m...
IEEEPACT
2006
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
2006
IEEE
As chip multiprocessors (CMPs) become increasingly mainstream, architects have likewise become more interested in how best to share a cache hierarchy among multiple simultaneous t...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...