33 search results - page 2 / 7 » Truthful Mechanisms for Generalized Utilitarian Problems |
FOCS
2005
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
2005
IEEE
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also bounds ...
CORR
2006
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2006
Springer
In set-system auctions, there are several overlapping teams of agents, and a task that can be completed by any of these teams. The auctioneer's goal is to hire a team and pay...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2010
ACM
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for singl...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2010
ACM
We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite g...
WINE
2007
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2007
Springer
This paper characterizes the family of truthful doublesided auctions. Despite the importance of double-sided auctions to market design, to date no characterization of truthful dou...