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FOCS
2005
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also bounds ...
Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy
WINE
2010
Springer
164views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 2 months ago
Incentives in Online Auctions via Linear Programming
Online auctions in which items are sold in an online fashion with little knowledge about future bids are common in the internet environment. We study here a problem in which an auc...
Niv Buchbinder, Kamal Jain, Mohit Singh
INFOCOM
2012
IEEE
11 years 7 months ago
Truthful spectrum auction design for secondary networks
Abstract—Opportunistic wireless channel access by nonlicensed users has emerged as a promising solution for addressing the bandwidth scarcity challenge. Auctions represent a natu...
Yuefei Zhu, Baochun Li, Zongpeng Li
GLOBECOM
2010
IEEE
13 years 2 months ago
Prolonging Network Lifetime via a Controlled Mobile Sink in Wireless Sensor Networks
In this paper we explore the mobility of a mobile sink in a wireless sensor network (WSN) to prolong the network lifetime. Since the mechanical movement of mobile sink is driven by...
Weifa Liang, Jun Luo, Xu Xu
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
172views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2003»
13 years 10 months ago
Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism ...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm