24 search results - page 1 / 5 » Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation |
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
13 years 9 months ago
2010
ACM
It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true for singl...
AAAI
2006
13 years 6 months ago
2006
We examine a setting in which a buyer wishes to purchase probabilistic information from some agent. The seller must invest effort in order to gain access to the information, and m...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
13 years 10 months ago
2005
ACM
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...
CORR
2006
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2006
Springer
In set-system auctions, there are several overlapping teams of agents, and a task that can be completed by any of these teams. The auctioneer's goal is to hire a team and pay...
STACS
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2004
Springer
Abstract. We consider the problem of scheduling jobs on related machines owned by selfish agents and provide the first deterministic mechanisms with constant approximation that a...