12 search results - page 2 / 3 » Undominated VCG redistribution mechanisms |
Publication
In this paper, we seek to design a Groves mechanism for
assigning p heterogeneous objects among n competing agents (n > p)
with unit demand, satisfying weak budget balance, in...
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2008
Springer
Many important problems in multiagent systems involve the allocation of multiple resources among the agents. If agents are self-interested, they will lie about their valuations fo...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2006
Springer
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
2009
ACM
We study the problem of how to allocate m identical items among n > m agents, assuming each agent desires exactly one item and has a private value for consuming the item. We as...
AMEC
2004
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2004
Springer
Abstract. Many practical scenarios involve solving a social choice problem: a group of self-interested agents have to agree on an outcome that best fits their combined preferences...