We consider the problem of minimizing preference elicitation in efficient multiattribute auctions, that support dynamic negotiation over non-price based attributes such as qualit...
We study mechanisms that can be modelled as coalitional games with transferable utilities, and apply ideas from mechanism design and game theory to problems arising in a network d...
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
We examine correlated equilibria in the recently introduced formalism of graphical games, a succinct representation for multiplayer games. We establish a natural and powerful rela...
Sham Kakade, Michael J. Kearns, John Langford, Lui...
We study auctions for a commodity in unlimited supply, e.g., a digital good. In particular we consider three desirable properties for auctions: • Competitive: the auction achiev...