WINE
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
We give a simple analysis of the competitive ratio of the random sampling auction from [10]. The random sampling auction was first shown to be worst-case competitive in [9] (with ...
WINE
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
Organizational employees have different knowledge demands and the knowledge is compound. So how to push the right compound knowledge to the right organizational employees becomes i...
WINE
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
Abstract. We give a simple characterization of all single-item truthrevealing auctions under some mild (and natural) assumptions about the auctions. Our work opens up the possibili...
WINE
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
A sharing community prospers when participation and contribution are both high. We suggest both, while being related decisions every peer makes, should be given separate rational ...
WINE
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
The assessment of credibility and reputation of contractors in online auctions is the key issue in providing reliable environment for customer-to-customer e-commerce. Confident re...
WINE
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
Abstract. Providing network connectivity to rural regions in the developing world is an economically challenging problem especially given the low income levels and low population d...
WINE
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
In this paper, we define a network service provider game. We show that the price of anarchy of the defined game can be bounded by analyzing a local search heuristic for a related...
WINE
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
Consider a network vulnerable to viral infection. The system security software can guarantee safety only to a limited part of the network. Such limitations result from economy cos...
WINE
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
We propose a simple and intuitive cost mechanism which assigns costs for the competitive usage of m resources by n selfish agents. Each agent has an individual demand; demands are...
WINE
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
We study the complexity issues for Walrasian equilibrium in a special case of combinatorial auction, called single-minded auction, in which every participant is interested in only ...