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WINE
2007
Springer
193views Economy» more  WINE 2007»
13 years 10 months ago
Auctions with Revenue Guarantees for Sponsored Search
We consider the problem of designing auctions with worst case revenue guarantees for sponsored search. This problem differs from previous work because of ad dependent clickthroug...
Zoë Abrams, Arpita Ghosh
COCOON
2007
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions
We formalize the definition of symmetric auctions to study fundamental properties of incentive compatible auction protocols. We characterize such auction protocols for those with ...
Xiaotie Deng, Kazuo Iwama, Qi Qi, Aries Wei Sun, T...
CEEMAS
2007
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Verifying Dominant Strategy Equilibria in Auctions
Future agent mediated eCommerce will involve open systems of agents interoperating between different institutions, where different auction protocols may be in use. We argue that i...
Emmanuel M. Tadjouddine, Frank Guerin
ATAL
2007
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Sequential Auctions in Uncertain Information Settings
This paper analyzes sequential auctions for private value objects using second-price sealed-bid rules. Now, the equilibrium bids for such auctions depend on the information uncerta...
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R....
GLOBECOM
2007
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
Auction-Based Distributed Resource Allocation for Cooperation Transmission in Wireless Networks
Abstract— Cooperative transmission can greatly improve communication system performance by taking advantage of the broadcast nature of wireless channels. Most previous work on re...
Jianwei Huang, Zhu Han, Mung Chiang, H. Vincent Po...
FOCS
2007
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy
We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic age...
Frank McSherry, Kunal Talwar
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
139views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Simple versus optimal mechanisms
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...
Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
132views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Limited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design
We study auctions for selling a limited supply of a single commodity in the case where the supply is known in advance and the case it is unknown and must be instead allocated in a...
Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline
WECWIS
2009
IEEE
104views ECommerce» more  WECWIS 2009»
13 years 11 months ago
Online Auctions: There Can Be Only One
—In recent years, the proliferation of the world wide web has lead to an increase in the number of public auctions on the internet. One of the characteristics of online auctions ...
Charu C. Aggarwal, Philip S. Yu
GLOBECOM
2009
IEEE
13 years 11 months ago
A Participation Incentive Market Mechanism for Allocating Heterogeneous Network Services
— This paper studies an auction based allocation of network resources for short-term contracts for heterogeneous network services. The combinatorial winner selection yields the o...
Juong-Sik Lee, Boleslaw K. Szymanski