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ECR
2007
92views more  ECR 2007»
13 years 5 months ago
An integrated model exploring sellers' strategies in eBay auctions
Abstract This paper presents the results of a field study conducted to elucidate critical factors that determine sellers’ net revenue in Internet auctions. Using two datasets of...
Jaeki Song, Jeff Baker
JSAC
2008
118views more  JSAC 2008»
13 years 5 months ago
Auction-Based Resource Allocation for Cooperative Communications
Abstract--Distributed and efficient resource allocation is critical for fully realizing the benefits of cooperative communications in large scale communication networks. This paper...
Jianwei Huang, Zhu Han, Mung Chiang, H. Vincent Po...
JCST
2008
128views more  JCST 2008»
13 years 5 months ago
t-Private and t-Secure Auctions
In most of the used auction systems the values of bids are known to the auctioneer. This allows him to manipulate the outcome of the auction. Hence, one is interested in hiding th...
Markus Hinkelmann, Andreas Jakoby, Peer Stechert
IJISEC
2006
108views more  IJISEC 2006»
13 years 5 months ago
How to obtain full privacy in auctions
Abstract Privacy has become a factor of increasing importance in auction design. We propose general techniques for cryptographic first-price and (M + 1)st-price auction protocols t...
Felix Brandt
IMCS
2008
58views more  IMCS 2008»
13 years 5 months ago
Efficient anonymous secure auction schema (ASAS) without fully trustworthy auctioneer
Purpose
Yoones Asgharzadeh Sekhavat, Mohammad Fathian
CORR
2006
Springer
160views Education» more  CORR 2006»
13 years 5 months ago
Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover
In set-system auctions, there are several overlapping teams of agents, and a task that can be completed by any of these teams. The auctioneer's goal is to hire a team and pay...
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldber...
DA
2010
109views more  DA 2010»
13 years 5 months ago
Auctioning the Right to Choose When Competition Persists
Several papers compare auctioning heterogeneous assets sequentially with sequentially selling the right to choose among assets not yet taken. Typically motivated by auctions of co...
Ronald M. Harstad
COR
2010
96views more  COR 2010»
13 years 5 months ago
Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions
Activity rules have emerged in recent years as an important aspect of practical auction design. The role of an activity rule in an iterative auction is to suppress strategic behav...
Pavithra Harsha, Cynthia Barnhart, David C. Parkes...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Mertacor: a successful autonomous trading agent
In this paper we present the internal architecture and bidding mechanisms designed for Mertacor, a successful trading agent, which ended up first in the Classic Trading Agent Comp...
Panos Toulis, Dionisis Kehagias, Pericles A. Mitka...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
Reducing price fluctuation in continuous double auctions through pricing policy and shout improvement
Auction mechanism design is a subfield of game theory dedicated to manipulating the rules of an auction so as to achieve specific goals. The complexity of the dynamics of auctions...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Elizabeth Sk...