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WINE
2005
Springer
182views Economy» more  WINE 2005»
14 years 2 months ago
Inapproximability Results for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Utility Functions
We consider the following allocation problem arising in the setting of combinatorial auctions: a set of goods is to be allocated to a set of players so as to maximize the sum of t...
Subhash Khot, Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markaki...
WINE
2009
Springer
194views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 3 months ago
Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders
A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem wi...
Ravi Kumar, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Sayedi