Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
We study auctions for a commodity in unlimited supply, e.g., a digital good. In particular we consider three desirable properties for auctions: • Competitive: the auction achiev...
We study mechanisms that can be modelled as coalitional games with transferable utilities, and apply ideas from mechanism design and game theory to problems arising in a network d...
We consider the problem of designing mechanisms for online problems in which agents arrive over time and the mechanism is unaware of the agent until the agent announces her arriva...
We develop a framework for trading in compound securities: financial instruments that pay off contingent on the outcomes of arbitrary statements in propositional logic. Buying o...
Lance Fortnow, Joe Kilian, David M. Pennock, Micha...
We present an automated exchange for trading complex goods, such as used cars, which allows traders to describe desirable purchases and sales by multiple attributes. The developed...
Some recent trends in business and manufacturing hold the promise of greater profits, yet, due to profit-robbing inventory increases, this promise has not been fully realized. [9]...
Indu Bingham, Barbara Hoefle, Kim Phan, Jim Sizemo...