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SIGECOM
2003
ACM
77views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 9 months ago
Computation in a distributed information market
Joan Feigenbaum, Lance Fortnow, David M. Pennock, ...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
92views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 9 months ago
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms, lying in the core, that recover 1/a fraction of the cost, are presented for the set cover and facility location games: a=O(log n) for the fo...
Nikhil R. Devanur, Milena Mihail, Vijay V. Vaziran...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
141views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 9 months ago
Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
125views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 9 months ago
Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish thing...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm