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SIGECOM
2005
ACM
132views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 10 months ago
Integrating tradeoff support in product search tools for e-commerce sites
In a previously reported user study, we found that users were able to perform decision tradeoff tasks more efficiently and commit considerably fewer errors with the example critiq...
Pearl Pu, Li Chen
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
134views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 10 months ago
Congestion games with failures
We introduce a new class of games, congestion games with failures (CGFs), which extends the class of congestion games to allow for facility failures. In a basic CGF (BCGF) agents ...
Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
90views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 10 months ago
ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange
We present the first design for a fully expressive iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE). The exchange incorporates a tree-based bidding language that is concise and expressive ...
David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Ad...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
106views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 10 months ago
On decentralized incentive compatible mechanisms
Algorithmic Mechanism Design focuses on Dominant Strategy Implementations. The main positive results are the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms and computationally ...
Ahuva Mu'alem
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
109views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 10 months ago
Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem using the Shapley value
A set of jobs need to be served by a single server which can serve only one job at a time. Jobs have processing times and incur waiting costs (linear in their waiting time). The j...
Debasis Mishra, Bharath Rangarajan
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
105views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 10 months ago
Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...
Ming-Yang Kao, Xiang-Yang Li, Weizhao Wang
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
117views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 10 months ago
First-price path auctions
We study first-price auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A first-price auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their ...
Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolov...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
120views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 10 months ago
Optimal design of English auctions with discrete bid levels
In this paper we consider a common form of the English auction that is widely used in online Internet auctions. This discrete bid auction requires that the bidders may only submit...
Esther David, Alex Rogers, Jeremy Schiff, Sarit Kr...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
153views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 10 months ago
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games
We present a new approach to representing coalitional games based on rules that describe the marginal contributions of the agents. This representation scheme captures characterist...
Samuel Ieong, Yoav Shoham
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
97views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2005»
13 years 10 months ago
Complexity of (iterated) dominance
We study various computational aspects of solving games using dominance and iterated dominance. We first study both strict and weak dominance (not iterated), and show that checki...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm